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Financial Risk Management: when does Independence
fail?
By AUGUSTIN LANDIER, DAVID SRAER AND DAVID THESMAR 
The recent turmoil on credit markets has drawn at-
tention to the risk management function. On many
trading oors around the world, traders have been
writing insurance against rare events: examples in-
clude keeping long positions on CDO tranches or sell-
ing protection against default (CDS). In normal times,
it is the role of risk management to ensure that the
received insurance premia are not entirely considered
as income, and that enough capital is set aside to pro-
tect the institution against the risk that it is taking. In
the period that led to the current crisis, however, risk
management has failed to play this role.1 This is par-
ticularly troubling as the nance industry is one that
has embraced the notion of using counter-powers to
limit risk and the importance of "dissent" within orga-
nizations. For instance, the Head of Risk Management
at KfW, a German bank, argued for the superiority of
having a central risk management function, inde-
pendent of the business units: The great advantage
[of central risk management] is the absence of con-
ict of interest. The central risk management is not
driven by the market. We look at the business from
a different angle; we are not involved at the personal
level. (quoted by PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2007).
The purpose of this paper is to study when such
virtuous organizational design may fail. We rst pro-
pose a model of risk management. Following Au-
gustin Landier et al (forthcoming), we model the trad-
ing oor as a simple hierarchy. The role of the trader
(T) is to select an asset to invest in, while the risk man-
ager (RM) can decide to approve, or not. Due to his
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1For instance, the Swiss bank UBS has identied risk
management malfunctions as one important source of its
multibillion dollar subprime related loss. UBS's analysis
identied a number of factors within the Risk Control func-
tions, specically within Market Risk, that suggest that the
overall Risk Control framework was insufciently robust
(UBS Shareholder Report on Writedowns)
compensation structure and limited liability, T has an
intrinsic preference for the riskiest asset, even though
such a selection can be value destroying. In this con-
text, giving a different compensation structure to the
RM may elicit an optimal behavior from the trader:
because she knows RM has no particular interest in
letting the risky asset go through, T will more often
feel compelled to make the efcient choice. Thus, our
model has a level of RM independence that alleviates
the trader's bias towards risk taking.
We then use this model to look at risk management
failures. First, we nd that in our model an increase
in the convexity of trader compensation diminishes
the likelihood that risk-management successfully in-
duces traders to pick the right asset. This allows us
to make sense of the claim that, in recent years, the
pressure that was put on traders to increase their PNL
may have prevented risk management from perform-
ing its function. Second, we nd that an increase in
the risk of assets traded reduces the favorable impact
of risk management independence. The intuition is
similar to the rst result: because T values the up-
side potential of assets, she becomes more biased
towards risky assets, and more insensitive to RM's
potential reluctance to approve. Third, in an exten-
sion of the model, we nd that risk-budgets contin-
gent on information help implementing the efcient
asset choice but become ineffective if that informa-
tion is noisier. Fourth, we investigate the potential for
side-payments to reduce the effectiveness of indepen-
dence. Such side payments occur when the trader can
implement a transfer to the risk manager, for instance
through career opportunities in the front ofce.2 Un-
der certain assumptions, we nd that an increase in
T compensation favors collusion on the Trading oor
and makes risk management ineffective.
Our paper deviates from the nance literature on
risk management by shifting the focus of the analy-
2For instance, Jérôme Kerviel, the rogue trader whose
directional bets on index futures led to a loss of 5bne at Soc-
Gen, a French bank, was a former back ofce employee.
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sis from methods of risk evaluation (see for instance
Anthony Saunders and Marcia Cornett, 2006), to-
wards organization design. We do not simply empha-
size the "dissenting" function of risk-management (a
la Landier et al, 2009) but show under what circun-
stances it is more likely to break-down. We believe
this is an important contribution as recent risk man-
agement failures seem to have been driven as much
by organizational issues as by the inherent difculty
to measure credit risk. For instance, citing the UBS
shareholder report on subprime-related write-downs,
René Stulz (2008) argues that communication of risk
exposure to the top management was highly inef-
cient.
In tackling the issue of risk management indepen-
dence, our paper borrows from the literature on het-
erogeneity in organizations. Most of the existing lit-
erature has the feature that delegation is a necessary
evil, since the resulting divergence in preferences be-
tween the principal and the agent distorts incentives
(as for instance in Guillermo Calvo and Stanislaw
Wellisz, 1979, or Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole,
1997, or more recentlyWouter Dessein, 2002 and Eric
Van Den Steen, 2007). More recently, some papers
have investigated the virtues of heterogeneity in or-
ganizations. Yeon-Koo Che and Navin Kartik (2008)
look at a the problem of a Decision Maker who needs
advice. They nd that it is always efcient to hire
an adviser with different priors, since it provides him
with incentives to search for information.
This paper has four remaining Sections. Section 2
presents the basic set-up. Section 3 characterizes the
equilibria in this simple set-up and derives compara-
tive statics. Sections 4 and 5 discuss extensions of the
basic model.
I. The Basic Model
A. Set-Up
The organization is an asset management rm
whose goal is to select an asset. It consists of two
agents: a Risk manager (he, RM) and a Trader (she,
T). There are two states S of Nature labeled 1 or 2,
both occuring with probability 1=2. The Trader se-
lects one of two assets labeled 1 or 2. The Risk-
manager approves, or not, the purchase of the asset.
The RM bases his decision on his information on the
cost of capital ec, which has c.d.f. F , assumed to be
twice differentiable and weakly concave.
Asset payoffseri (i D 1; 2) are the following. When
the state of nature is i , asset i pays off Ri . When the
state of nature is j 6D i , then asset i fails: it pays off
 L i . We assume that both assets have identical ex-
ante present values (i.e. R1  L1 D R2  L2) and that
asset 1 is riskier (R1 > R2).
We turn to payoffs for T and RM. When no asset
is selected, both T and RM receive zero utility ow.
When asset i is selected, T receives utility g.eri /. g
is the indirect utility of the Trader and captures the
combination of attitude toward risk and compensa-
tion contracts. T is limitedly liable for the loss on
her portfolio g. L i / D 0. Quite intuitively, we as-
sume g0 > 0: hence, g.R1/ > g.R2/. T thus has an
intrinsic preference for the riskier asset.
When asset i is selected and approved, the RM re-
ceives indirect utility h.eri /  ec. First, the RM's util-
ity is decreasing in the cost of capital: this assump-
tion is meant to capture the fact that it is the role
of risk managers to allocate the Value at Risk across
different traders. Thus, accepting T's asset prevents
the Risk-Manager from accepting other investments.
Implictly, we therefore assume that the RM wants to
maximize the number of investments realized by the
business units under his supervision, or that he is sup-
posed to internalize the opportunity cost of accepting
high cost of capital assets. Secondly, the Risk man-
ager's indirect utility h is a function of the asset's
nal payoff. If eri < 0, we assume limited liability
such that h.eri / D 0. If the asset's payoff is positive,
h.Ri / > 0. Thus, the risk manager is partly sensitive
to the success. We do not, however, need to assume
that h.R1/ > h.R2/.
Furthermore, in order to simplify the exposition,
we assume that the Trader is more risk seeking than
the Risk-manager in the following sense:
(1)
g.R1/
g.R2/
>
F .h.R2/=2/
F .h.R1/=2/
which means that Trader's utility is steep enough in
the upside potential of assets.
B. Timing
The sequence of actions has four different steps.
At date 1, there is a publicly available signal  on the
state of nature. The signal precision is  D P. D
i jS D i/ > 1=2. At date 2, the Trader chooses the
asset (1 or 2). In period 3, the Risk-manager learns
the cost of capitalec. He approves investment, or not.
In period 4, nal payoffs are realized.
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C. Equilibrium Denition
The strategy space is the following. When T picks
asset j , she reacts to the signal  , as well as her ex-
pectation of the RM's approval decision e. In turn,
the RM's approval decision  depends on the signal
 , the cost of capitalec, and the asset j selected by T.
We look for the (unique) subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium of this game.
II. Baseline Model
We rst characterize two types of equilibria. Reac-
tive equilibria are equilibria where the Trader always
selects the best asset, i.e. the asset that ts the signal
(asset 1 with signal 1, asset 2 in case of signal 2). Non
reactive equilibria are equilibria where the Trader al-
ways selects asset 1, i.e. the asset for which she has
an intrinsic bias.
PROPOSITION 1: Equilibrium characterization
1. Assume that:
:F.h.R2//:g.R2/ >
.1  /:F..1  /h.R1//:g.R1/(2)
In this case, the equilibrium is reactive, i.e. the
Trader always selects the asset that ts the signal.
2. If condition (2) is not met, then the equilibrium
is non reactive, i.e. the Trader always selects asset 1.
The above proposition demonstrates that the equi-
librium is either reactive or non reactive. Condition
(2) ensures that T, after observing signal 2, indeed
prefers to select asset 2 over asset 1.3 The left hand
side of this condition is the expected utility of a Trader
selecting asset 2: the RM will approve it with proba-
bility F.h.R2//, upon approval, the asset will have a
positive payoff with probability , and in this case, the
Trader will receive g.R2/. The right hand side is the
expected utility of a Trader that selects asset 1, even
if the signal is 2. In this case, the RM will approve
with probability F..1   /h.R1//, the probability of
3The condition ensuring that T selects asset 1 when the
signal is 1 is given by:
:F.h.R1//:g .R1/ >
.1  / F..1  / h.R2//:g .R2/
which, given that  > 1=2 and condition (1), always holds.
positive payoff is only 1   , and T can expect com-
pensation g.R1/. Overall, one simple consequence of
condition (2) is that, when the signal is more infor-
mative ( larger), risk management is better at elicit-
ing reactivity. This comes from the fact that both RM
and T prefer the asset that has a positive payoff, even
though the Trader has a bias towards asset 1.
The above proposition leads to a few interesting
comparative static properties which we summarize in
the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: The scope for the reactive equi-
librium diminishes when :
1. The trader's compensation becomes more sensi-
tive to high payoffs,
2. The risk-manager's compensation becomes
more sensitive to high payoffs,
3. The payoffs of the risky asset are hit by a mean-
preserving spread.
First, if the Trader's compensation becomes more
sensitive to the upside potential of assets, the scope
for reactive equilibria diminishes. This can be seen
by increasing g .R1/ =g .R2/ in condition (2)4. Basi-
cally, when the bias of the trader becomes too strong,
it overwhelms the resistance of risk-management. The
witnesses of the failure of risk-management within
large banks often mention the overwhelming power
of incentives at the front-ofce as the source of the
back-ofce inability to "pull the break". For exam-
ple, according to a senior executive in a troubled bank,
"Senior managers got addicted to the revenues and ar-
rogant about the risks they were running. As long as
you could grow revenues, you could keep your bonus
growing" (Eric Dash and Julie Creswell, 2008). Sec-
ond, if the Risk Manager's compensation becomes
more sensitive to the upside of the asset, reactivity
is also impaired. This amounts to increasing h .R1/
while holding h .R2/ constant in condition (2). This
particular comparative static exercise allows to ratio-
nalize the need for risk manager's independence: to
act as an efcient counterpower, risk managers cannot
enjoy much of the upside generated by the investment
he is supposed to supervise.
Third, an increase in the risk of asset 1 reduces, in
general, the scope for reactivity. To see this, assume
the RM's compensation is at: h .R1/ D h .R2/ D w.
This maximizes RM independence under the (natural)
constraint that h0 > 0. In this case, a mean-preserving
4An increase in the trader's optimism about the risky
project outcome would have that effect too.
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spread of asset 1 is equivalent to increasing R1 while
holding R1   L1 constant. This makes condition (2)
less likely to hold and reactivity harder to sustain.
Thus, our baseline model suggests that an increase
in the risk borne by a particular class of assets, may
make risk management ineffective, even though its
compensation makes it relatively independent.
III. Information-dependent Cost of Capital
In this Section, we amend the baseline model by al-
lowing the cost of capital to depend on the signal. An
organization might choose to make the cost of capi-
tal higher (lower) for projects about which negative
(positive) information is received. As we show, this
should, in theory, be the case, but in practice some
banks have had trouble implementing it. To make
computations simple and transparent, we assume that,
conditional on signal i , the cost of capital of asset i
isec, while the cost of capital of asset j 6D i isec C .
Hence, the cost of capital of the asset that is not in line
with the signal is larger: this reects the fact that the
riskiness of the unt asset is higher, and hence, should
command a higher cost of capital.
The rest of the model is identical to the baseline
model. In this context, it is easy to show that the reac-
tivity condition (2) becomes:
:F.h.R2//:g.R2/ >
.1  /:F..1  /h.R1/  /:g.R1/(3)
Assume the signal is 2. If the Trader selects asset 2,
the risk manager will approve if and only if h.R2/ >ec, as in the baseline model. But in the new model, if T
selects asset 1, the Risk Manager approves if and only
ifec < .1  /h.R1/  . Hence, the fact that the cost
of capital is correlated with the signal reinforces the
RM's incentives to reject the wrong asset selection.
Thus, an increase in  relaxes the new condition (3)
and makes reactivity easier to sustain.
PROPOSITION 3: For all parameters, there exists
a  above which the reactive equilibrium is imple-
mented.
All in all, the model suggests that it is always pos-
sible to insure reactivity by making the cost of capital
borne by the risk-manager contingent on information
received about projects. Anecdotal evidence suggests
banks did not all use such mechanism. For instance,
UBS (2008) reveals that "the full benet of UBS's
ability to obtain funding at a relatively low cost in
the market was passed through to the business, with-
out any adjustment to reect the nature of the relevant
business activity". In practice, implementing a state-
contingent cost-of-capital can be done by using the
risk premia implicit in observed asset prices. How-
ever, this mechanism looses its grip when (1) informa-
tion if weak (low ) or (2) the cost of capital is con-
tingent on market-prices that reect abnormally low
risk-premia (low ). For example, if the cost of lever-
aging positions becomes abnormally small compared
to the underlying risks, the cost of capital will become
ineffective at implementing reactivity. In our model,
this effect is even amplied when assets are riskier or
trader compensation contracts more convex in perfor-
mance.
IV. Collusion on the Trading Floor
This last Section looks at collusion between T and
RM. To do this, we assume that side payments be-
tween T and RM are feasible: for instance, traders
can offer potentially lucrative career opportunities to
risk managers in exchange for lax supervision.
We focus on the case where condition (2) is satis-
ed: in the absence of side payments, reactivity would
prevail. Furthermore, to simplify exposition, we only
consider the case when the signal is 2. At this stage,
we reduce T's choices to the following alternative: ei-
ther she selects asset 2, or she selects asset 1 and gives
the bribe w to the RM conditional on approval. In this
case, the expected utility from selecting asset 1 and
bribing the RM is given by:
max
w
F..1  / h.R1/C w/:

.1  /:g.R1/  w

while the expected utility from selecting asset 2 and
not bribing the RM is simply :F.h.R2//:g.R2/.
Then, it is straightforward to show the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION 4: Assume F.x/ D x and g .R1/ >
h .R1/ Then, there exists a set of parameters such
that:
1. the equilibrium without side-payments is reac-
tive
2. the equilibrium with side-payment is non reac-
tive
Moreover, this set of parameters expands as
g .R1/  h .R1/ increases.
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Thus, collusion may make independent risk man-
agement less effective, in a fashion similar to Jean
Tirole (1986). As it turns out, the internal inquiry
following the $7.7 billion fraudulent trading loss at
Société Générale in January 2008 mentions internal
collusion involving a Middle Ofce operational agent
dedicated to JK's [Jérôme Kerviel, the rogue trader]
activity (Société Générale, 2008). The other result
of proposition 4 is that, as the difference in upsides
between T and RM increase, side-payments are more
and more likely (in the sense of an increase in the pa-
rameter space) to reduce reactivity. Indeed, when T
has much to gain with the risky asset, she can afford to
compensate the RM for not blocking the investment.
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